

Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

ART. III.—1. *The Elements of Political Science.* In Two Books.—Book I. *On Method.*—Book II. *On Doctrine. With an Account of* ANDREW YARRANTON, *the Founder of English Political Economy.* By PATRICK EDWARD DOVE, Author of "The Theory of Human Progression." Edinburgh: Johnstone and Hunter. 1854.

2. *The Theory of Human Progression, and Natural Probability of a Reign of Justice.* Boston: Benjamin B. Mussey & Co. 1851.

WHEN Axel Oxenstiern, that most enlightened of Swedish statesmen, was sending forth his son to mingle in the confusion of foreign courts and the contentions of diplomatists, he bade him observe with how little wisdom the world was governed; and that there was as much of truth as of irony in the old Chancellor's insinuation may be inferred from the fact, that it has become in subsequent times a trite and familiar aphorism. It is still true, yet not, we hope, to the same extent, that wild caprice, irrational empiricism, or superstitious credence forms the basis of political action; and though the age in which we live may justly boast of its social culture and scientific progress, that highest and noblest of arts, the art of legislation, is still involved in the doubt of tentative hypothesis rather than the certainty of perfected theory. But that legislation as an art should have thus preceded politics as a science affords no matter of surprise, when we consider the relations of science and art in almost every department of human activity and enterprise; for if the latter reached its perfection only by the aid of the former, it is equally true that the former has most frequently found its first hint in the essays of the latter. There is no art, however, (be its manipulations as rude as they may,) which does not involve a theory of some kind, and it is not until this theory is disengaged by the reason, that we have the matter or the method of a science whose didactic forms and amended rules may react on the art to which they relate.

Some have questioned whether a science of politics be possible of discovery, and still more have questioned whether,

if discovered, it is capable of substantiation in the actual figure of society. The author of the works before us purposes to answer both of these questions, and ventures to answer them in the affirmative. The name of Mr. Dove will, perhaps, be a new one to some among our readers; but many are, doubtless, familiar with his earlier work on the "Theory of Human Progression," for, though issued anonymously, it soon attracted the attention of studious and inquiring minds, by the boldness, the grandeur, and the originality of its speculations. His writings evince a wonderful acumen of intellect in the apprehension and analysis of truth, while his perfect mastery of logic enables him to condense and evolve the abstractions of his reason in processes of thought which seem resistless and irrefragable in their separate steps, even when we shrink from the destination and landing-place to which they inevitably conduct us. Mr. Dove is an inexorable *ergoist.* In this respect he might, perhaps, be more appropriately called the slave of the syllogism than its master, since he does not seem so much to drive it as to be driven by it. He advances with unflinching and unfaltering steps to conclusions, however startling, when he has once convinced himself that they result from the premises posited by his reason. He is eminently a logician as distinguished from the mere dialectician.

It is this trait of his mental organization which fits him for the task he has assumed. His postulate is, not only to exhibit the science of politics, but first to discover the science itself, much as Nebuchadnezzar exacted of his magicians to tell him both his dream and its interpretation. An intellect at once acute and subtile is of the first importance in all political investigations which have for their object the evolution of a science. To pass from the known to the unknown is the highest achievement of mind. The veriest drudges and pedants of the schools may master the *Cogitata et Visa* of a Bacon, but it needs a Bacon to have thought and observed before them. A multitude shall be found to occupy and settle new worlds of science, which only a Columbus was able to discover, without, perhaps, being able to explore them. With these preliminary observations, we proceed at once to a consideration of the volumes before us.

That there is such a body of truth as that involved in a theoretical science of politics, must be apparent to every rational mind, from the absurdity to which the contrary hypothesis conducts us; for, as Mr. Dove correctly argues, if there is no truth and no falsehood, no right and no wrong in political conduct, then every man may do what he lists if he only has the power. For if there be no difference between good and evil antecedently to all laws, there can be no reason why any laws should be made, since all things must be naturally indifferent. But if there is a truth and a right in politics, they may be investigated, it would seem, on the same principles as any other science. It remains, therefore, for man to educe these principles, not only in order to incorporate them into a dogmatic system of truth, but as the antecedent step necessary for their embodiment in the organization of states.

But what do we mean by a *science?* The beautiful definition of Sir William Hamilton is adopted by Mr. Dove, and we know of none better. "A science is a complement of cognitions, having in point of form the character of logical perfection, and in point of matter the character of real truth." The sciences are divided into the *abstract* and *experimental*, or the *deductive* and *inductive*. The abstract sciences depart from certain primordial notions of necessary truth which are combined by the deductive reason into a body of doctrine; the experimental sciences collect facts and make observations in the realm of nature, in order to infer by the inductive reason the general law to which certain orders of phenomena are uniformly subject. The former are cognizant of necessary truth, the latter of general truth; the former derive their substratum from the constitution of the mind, the latter are founded on the arrangements of the physical world; the former converse with axioms which the reason accepts as true *a priori*, the latter deal with positive facts and the laws by which they are generalized *a posteriori*. It is important, however, to observe that the abstract sciences are capable of verification in the domain of nature, and may be illustrated by experiment, though their truth is seen to be wholly independent of the actual arrangements of the physical world; and it is also worthy of remark, that the sciences which are *inductive* in the

processes which lead to their discovery become *deductive* after their ordination into a body of generalized truth. Or, as Mr. Dove states it, in his fondness for the syllogism, the abstract sciences start from the major or minor premise to find the conclusion, while in the physical sciences we have the minor premise and conclusion given to find the major premise; but so soon as the major premise is clearly made out, we can reason deductively, as in the mathematical sciences, merely substituting the generalized law in the one case for the necessary cognition in the other.

What, then, are the fundamental cognitions which constitute the body of political science? Every science has its *object-noun;* this object-noun has its forms; and these forms have their relations, which it is the province of the reason to discover and classify. Thus, the object-noun of geometry is *space*, and its forms are comprised by lines and surfaces, straight lines and curves, squares, parallelograms, and circles. These forms have their relations, which may be deduced by the axiomatic reason.

"But," says Mr. Dove, "propositions can be connected through axioms only by making one proposition a major premise, another a minor premise, and the third that results from them a consequent. In the abstract sciences the propositions given are the major premise (axioms) and the minor premise (the form of the object-noun), and the proposition required is the necessary consequent that results from these two. In the inductive sciences, the propositions given are the consequent (namely, the observed phenomenon considered as *an effect*), and the minor premise (namely, the *conditions* of matter), and the required proposition is the major premise, — namely, any such general proposition as will complete the syllogism, and make the consequent follow logically from it and the minor premise. Viewed in this light, the necessity of *observation* in the inductive sciences, and its non-necessity in the abstract sciences, become immediately apparent."

In order, therefore, to construct a science of politics, we must inquire what is its object-noun, what are the forms into which this object-noun may be classified, and what are the constituent propositions which compose the "complement of its cognitions," — the body of its doctrine.

It is evident that the science of politics, whatever may be

its form and method, treats exclusively of men and of the relations between them; but relations in what? In religion, in benevolence, or in benefit? In none of these, for they each involve a series of categories peculiarly their own; but *in relations of equity*. *Equity* is the noun-substantive of politics. It is necessary distinctly to ascertain and settle the *position* of politics as a science before we proceed to an investigation of its principles; for this position must determine the fundamental ideas of the whole system of truth to which it relates. Love, benevolence, charity, and fraternity, though beautiful and beneficial in the intercourse of society, are not the nouns-substantive of which political science discourses. The laws of benevolence, of charity, and of love, whatever they are, do not become appreciable, or even intelligible, until inflexible justice has clearly defined the distinctions between *meum*, *tuum*, and *suum*. Equity, which has its foundation in the reason, must be substantiated in society before generosity, which has its impulse in the heart, can be intelligently or virtuously practised. The laws of benevolence, therefore, lie without the sphere of political science, and must, in their full development, be *posterior* to it. But *anterior* to the formal and perfect establishment of the maxims of justice, certain social arrangements may be instituted for the common welfare and benefit. So far as these interfere, if at all, with the equitable rights of a single individual, they fall within the scope of political science; but so far as they involve considerations of *benefit*, they belong to the inductive science of *political economy*, as distinguished from the abstract science of politics.

In order that the laws of political economy may have their full and distinct development, it is necessary, then, to separate them by a line of demarcation from the intuitive and axiomatic laws which govern the relations of men in equity; and in order that the laws of benevolence may be magnified and made honorable, they must be preceded by the laws of inexorable justice, as a necessary condition to their legitimate exercise. Now, the science which investigates, discovers, and co-ordinates the relations of men in equity is the science of politics; it has man for its subject, equity for its object, and

the equitable or inequitable relations of men for its factors. It presupposes man to be a moral being endowed with intellect, will, and passions, — an intellect which furnishes the idea or sentiment of justice, a will which renders him responsible for his actions in the figure of society, and passions which may impel him to the commission of political offences. It takes cognizance of political offences only as breaches of equity. The cognizance of *sins* it relegates to the law and tribunal of the Judge of all the earth.

The *method* of the science necessarily follows from the nature of its substantive principles; for if these consist merely in the classification of man's relations in equity, and if equity be an ultimate and primordial concept (axiom) of the human reason, it follows that the science of politics must be abstract in its maxims, and consequently *deductive* in the evolution of its constituent propositions. The science in its dogma is the definite statement of "the rational laws" which determine the equitable relations of men in society, and just so far it is abstract; but in its reduction to practice it consists in "the application of ascertained truth to the conditions of man on the globe," and just so far it is concrete. Regarded in its abstract aspect, the science of politics is comprised in a few axioms, with the application of those axioms to the mental concepts *duty*, *crime*, *right*, and *wrong*, as touching the *life*, *liberty*, *property*, and *reputation* of our fellow-men, from which application results the logical deduction of certain consequences, the truth of which is wholly independent of human volition or of the actual state of society. But regarded on its concrete side, the rational law of the science is transformed into an objective rule of political action, for the restraint and guidance of "the millions of moral beings associated together on the earth."

"The terms *duty*, *crime*, *right*, *wrong*, and *property*, taken as substantive concepts of the intellect, are simple, incapable of analysis, and consequently incapable of definition. But they may be viewed in another light. The general form or abstract concept is incapable of real definition, but the concrete form or particular case is capable of *determination;* otherwise a practical rule of action could not be evolved. We must consider, therefore, not what concepts *compose* duty and crime in

the abstract, (they being not compound, and consequently indecomposable,) but what characteristics of an action *constitute* it a duty or a crime. We have, therefore, to unite the abstract concepts and principles, which belong exclusively to the reason, with the concrete characteristics of an action, which are derived exclusively from observation, and the question presents itself in this light: — Given, the concept equity, with its axioms, and the physical characteristics of an action, to determine whether it be a duty or a crime, or neither."

Since the rights of men are founded on the assumption of a moral law apprehended and sanctioned by the intuitive reason, and since this moral law is universal, (for every axiom that relates to equity must be universal with regard to all forms of equity, just as every axiom which relates to space is universal with regard to all forms of space,) it necessarily follows that the universality of the law is subtended by an equality of natural rights; for the law which imposes on all men the same duties, demands for all men an equality in the rights which are the correlatives of these duties.

Having thus ascertained the nature, the position, and the method of political science, as developed by Mr. Dove, we proceed to give a succinct statement of the axioms and constituent propositions by which it is evolved. We quote and condense from our author.

Axioms relating to Human Freedom in Relations of Equity.

1. No man has a right *to originate* an interference with another man.
2. A just interference (of one man with another) must be based on a reason sufficient in equity. An interference that has not a reason sufficient in equity is not a just interference.
3. All just interference of one man with another man must be based on the fact that this other man has originated an interference with ourselves or others.

Axioms relating to Property in Relations of Equity.

1. An object is the property of its creator.
2. Right should lead to possession.
3. A proprietor may give his right.
4. A proprietor may lend his right.

5. He who receives a gift from the proprietor becomes the proprietor of the gift.

6. He who rents an object from the proprietor becomes just lessee of the object.

7. A proprietor may justly defend his property.

8. A proprietor may justly recover his property.

General Axioms.

1. *Politically*, a man may do what he pleases with his own powers or property, provided he does not interfere with another man. [That is, whatever a man does, without *interfering* with another (by force, fraud, or defamation), does not come within the limits of *politics*. His personal actions belong to personal, not to political morals.]

2. A whole is equal to its parts; a whole can contain nothing but the aggregate of its constituent parts.

3. All men are bound by the laws of justice.

4. Two rights cannot be contradictory.

Postulates.

1. It is possible for men to act equitably or inequitably towards each other.

2. It is possible for men to possess portions of the earth equitably or inequitably.

3. Labor may create new value in raw material.

Propositions of the Science.*

Proposition I. — That all men are *equal* in natural rights.

Proposition II. — That a man has not a right to do everything.

Proposition III. — That men have a right to do something.

Proposition IV. — Problem: To find the equitable limit of political action. Demonstration: Seeing that men have a moral right to do something, but not a moral right to do

* We have not thought it necessary to give the formal demonstration of all these *theoretical* propositions, as they can be easily deduced by every reader from the axioms of the science. But the *Problem* enunciated in Proposition IV. may need a formal discussion, since it is the concrete application of this problem to actual society that constitutes the aim and end of political theory.

everything, it is required to find the general and abstract limitations which divide possible actions into equitable and inequitable. Let X and Y represent two men, equal in rights. X has a right to use his powers to a certain extent still undetermined; and Y has a right to use his powers to a similar extent. We say, then, that the limit of equitable action must be at the *point of interference;* because, if X has a right of interference with Y, Y has a corresponding right of interference with X, and each may appeal to force to carry his right into effect; but an appeal to force cannot be equitable *on both sides*, for two rights cannot be contradictory. But since in equity every man has a political right to use his powers or his property just so far as he can without interfering with others, and no farther, it follows that the *point of interference* is the equitable limit of man's action in the figure of political society.

Proposition V. — No majority of men may equitably interfere with a minority, or with a single individual.

Proposition VI. — Society can contain only those rights which belong to the individuals composing society.

Such are the theoretical principles of political science according to Mr. Dove. It will be observed that the "rational law" of equity which determines the science is essentially negative in its character. It forbids the *origination* of all primary interference of man with his fellows, and this restrictive law becomes positive in its tendency and working only by virtue of a prior act of interference which requires to be corrected. "The *theoretic truth* determines the relations of moral beings, and consequently determines what ought to be their conditions with regard to each other; the *practical rule* determines what man may, or may not, do *justly*, and consequently what the political construction of civil society ought to be."

Leaving in abeyance the application of these principles to the correction of particular social evils and inequalities growing out of political institutions, we turn to consider what probabilities there are that the science of politics, whatever it be, will eventually find its realization in the sphere of society; and in considering this branch of our subject we shall adopt

a classification somewhat different from that of Mr. Dove, though substantially identical with his.

We arrange these probabilities, then, under four distinct heads, which may be stated as follows: — 1. Probabilities derived from the theoretical and chronological order of scientific evolution; 2. Probabilities derived from the observed progress of human civilization; 3. Probabilities derived from the identity or correlation of the subjective world of thought and the objective world in which man is located; and 4. Probabilities derived from the tendencies of Christianity and the Scriptural predictions of its universal prevalence.

I. Cicero, in a familiar passage, declares that all studies which pertain to liberal knowledge are bound together by a certain tie of kindred. "Etenim omnes artes, quæ ad humanitatem pertinent, habent quoddam commune vinculum, et quasi cognatione quadam inter se continentur." So too thought Leibnitz, of whom Fontenelle justly said, that he drove all the sciences abreast. Numerous attempts have been made to arrange the sciences in a scheme which should exhibit their genealogy and their ages, — the order and period of their development. Bacon and Vico have each thrown out suggestions on the subject; Turgot and Condorcet still further essayed a formal classification of the various departments of knowledge; and, in later times, the same task has been resumed by different thinkers in different parts of Europe, — by Hegel and others in Germany, by Auguste Comte in France, and by Mr. Dove in Scotland. It is interesting to remark that the logical conclusions of the three writers we have last named corroborate and verify one another, — the German idealist adopting substantially the same arrangement of the sciences as that of the French positive philosopher; while the "Theory" of Mr. Dove — conducting him, as it does, to a scheme of scientific classification which, though pursued, we learn, without a knowledge of the previous labors of M. Comte, differs from *his* earlier solution of the problem only in being more exact, complete, and cogent — would seem to afford cumulative verification of the common truth which lies at the base of their respective systems. The fact that Leibnitz, in Germany, and Newton, in England, discovered the method

of Fluxions, each at about the same time and each independently of the other, instead of setting the English and French Academies at variance in a vain dispute as to the priority of discovery, should the rather have united them in the joint defence of a calculus whose verity was at first impugned, and whose "differentials" Bishop Berkeley, for instance, laughed at as "the ghosts of departed quantities."

The thread upon which is suspended the connection and interdependence of the sciences is to be sought in a consideration of the comparative simplicity or complexity of the phenomena to which they relate. The sciences which treat of phenomena that are complex and multiform must necessarily be evolved after those which are comparatively simple in their principles or general in their subject-matter, and this order of chronological development illustrates also the logical dependence of the respective sciences, as is remarked by both Comte and Dove. "This dependence manifests itself in the fact, that the one science applied to the forms of the fundamental noun-substantive of the next science, actually *becomes the next science.* Thus, logic applied to *number* becomes arithmetic; arithmetic applied to *quantities* becomes algebra; algebra applied to *spaces* becomes geometry; and geometry applied to *force* becomes statics." Classed according to the complexity of their phenomena, the sciences may, then, be arranged as follows: —

1. The *Formal Science*, or Logic, which is present in all science. 2. The *Mathematical Sciences*, divided into Arithmetic, Algebra, and Geometry. 3. The *Force Sciences*, comprising Statics and Dynamics, with their applications in Astronomy. 4. The *Matter Sciences*, organic and inorganic, involving the whole circle of the physical sciences, from Mechanics to Animal Physiology. 5. The *Man Sciences* of Political Economy and of Politics.

Here the one science must precede the other in chronological discovery, remarks our author, because it is requisite to render that other science discoverable. And the law of this dependence of one science on another is, that the truths of the antecedent science, which are the objects of research when we study that science, become subjective — that is, means of op-

eration — when we study the consequent science. Accordingly, it is by marking this law of intellectual development which is observed in the sciences already reduced to ordination, and which when projected into the future entitles us to predict that the progress of scientific discovery must also logically evolve the sciences which relate to man, that we infer the probability of their ultimate discovery in theory, and their actual realization in fact.

"If man progresses in knowledge from the more simple to the more complex, — and there can be no doubt that he does progress, according to this law, — it is plainly evident that *man*, being the most complex of all the objects that inhabit the earth, must be the *last* whose phenomena are subjected to analysis. Let the sciences be classed as they may, *man and man's functions* must always be placed at the extreme end of the scale of natural knowledge; and, consequently, it is no wonder that man-science is not completed when men are only approaching the completion of matter-science."

II. History also furnishes its contingent of probabilities in favor of political science. Time, said the old Greek philosopher, is the wisest of all things. The history of the race passed before the august mind of Pascal as the biography of an individual "who never dies and who learns continually." The evolution of a political science may, therefore, perhaps be computable from a study of the past developments of human progress. History, it is to be remarked, has its dynamical phenomena as well as its statical, and these two orders of phenomena have their respective laws, which it is the province of *historical dynamics* and *statics* to discover and co-ordinate. History in the totality of its events is infinite and incomprehensible, and must be for ever unwritten; in her mythical and ideal character the Muse Clio may be said to resemble the fabled goddess of Egypt, who bore on her marble front the inscription, "I am all that has been, is, or shall be, and none among mortals has hitherto taken off my veil." Yet history may be studied to a certain extent in its minuter features and in its grander proportions; we may read its lessons in the annals of a single age and nation, or rise to the study of those relations which bind together all ages and nations in the evolution of a rational aim and ultimate *status*. History,

in fact, implies a law of progress; for, as Schelling somewhere says, "There can be a history of such beings alone as have before them an ideal which can never be realized by the individual man, but only by the race considered as a whole," for this ideal it is which causes man, in his social activity, to differ from the irrational and instinctive creation. Creatures governed by instinct can properly have no history, because they are incapable of progress. The bee that hummed in the garden of Eden on the morning of creation built its waxen cells in hexagons precisely similar to those of the swarms which, centuries afterwards, dropped their honey in the carcass of the lion slain by Samson, or which, later still, robbed of their sweets the flowers of Hybla and Hymettus, or which in our own day store away their treasure in "patent" hives. The phenomena of the brute creation are all statical; but those of man evince a dynamic power which is constantly tending to lift the individual into a higher and still higher condition, and the race into a higher and still higher civilization. The working of this power we can distinctly perceive, though we may not be able to state the law of its action, or to point distinctly the teleological principle which directs its tendency.

Now, does the history of civilization warrant us in the attempt to compute the probable evolution of a science of politics? and if so, how are we to compute it? Vico, in his day, remarked that the "certitude of laws is nothing more than the obscurity of the reason enforced by authority"; that is, as we understand him, laws which are not manifestly just are still rigorously executed in order to assert the sanctity and inviolability of law in the abstract. In modern times we have fallen upon a different plan for the establishment of this desirable certitude. It is deemed the first requisite of a law that it be just, and, as Mr. Dove well says, the vast changes which take place in human legislation, as a country advances in civilization, are nothing more than the slow and gradual transference of laws from the subjective will of the legislator to the objective principles of truth; the boundaries of legislation are undergoing a gradual but sure course of circumscription, and, as time rolls on, the approximation to equity becomes nearer and nearer; and hence it is that we venture to infer from the

past the future establishment of that science which seeks to discover and systematize the relations of man in equity. It is the past which has evolved the present, and the present is pregnant with the future. The principles of justice *are*, if they are not yet exemplified in the actual state of human society; *sunt, sed tempore absunt*, in the idea of Cicero.

Thus it is that history points us to the definite end of all political striving; for from the "concrete changes which have already taken place" we can infer the "abstract course of political change" in the general, or, to speak in the language of mathematics, the differential elements of consecutive ages enable us to integrate the formula of change according to which those differential elements have been generated.

III. We proceed, in the third place, to consider the logical grounds derived from the analogies of nature, upon which we may base the belief that political science is something other and better than a figment of the imagination. The term *science*, whenever employed, or embracing whatever category of facts or cognitions, always presupposes two things: an abstract or generalizing faculty of the mind, by which we are enabled to examine and pronounce upon the relations which it reveals between our facts or cognitions, and the actual existence, or possibility at least, of those relations in the realm of nature. The intellect of man and the constitution of external nature are constructed on a principle of reciprocal harmony. The microcosm within us corresponds, by a "pre-established harmony," with the world without us. It was not until Faust had opened the book of nature, and contemplated the sign of the Macrocosm, that he beheld nature working in his soul's presence, and saw how in the universe all weaves itself into the whole.

> "Ich schau' in diesen reinen Zügen
> Die wirkende Natur vor meiner Seele liegen.
>
> Wie alles sich zum Ganzen webt
> Eins in dem andern wirkt und lebt!"

And so it is not until we apprehend this original and connatural adaptation of the human reason to the objective world, that we can understand man's position in the universe;

but if the same God is the creator of the mind within us and of the physical creation without us, then we may infer that what the reason apprehends "to be *true*, must, when reduced to practice, produce *good*, and not evil," for, says our author, between the intellectual reason of mankind and the operations of nature there is the most perfect parallelism; and this parallelism affords an undoubted proof of the objective veracity of the subjective convictions of the human mind.

> "Truth and Good are one,
> And Beauty dwells in them, and they in her,
> With like participation."

Politics, it is true, is an abstract science, and its principles are wholly independent, in theory, of the existing relations of men in society. The duties it enjoins would remain right in theory if there was no world in which they could be illustrated; but, since they are the duties of men in their actual relations, these duties become actually obligatory upon all men in the figure of society. And since an amended order of thought never fails, sooner or later, to express itself in an amended product of human action, why may we not logically infer the final consummation of political progress from the practical operation of a perfected dogma of politics? If a political science be possible in theory, does it not become probable in practice, when we consider that an all-wise and beneficent Creator has made the reason and the external world each to tally with the other, and not the latter to mock and tantalize the former?

IV. The theological probabilities of a final reign of justice fill a large space in Mr. Dove's "Theory of Human Progression," and on this subject the mind of the reader cannot fail to be struck by the grandeur of his speculations, if it fails to be convinced of their truth. He undertakes to show that the history of man's progress in the past would, of itself, have afforded a rational presage of the *natural probability of a millennium*, even if such a period had never been predicted in Holy Writ. History is thus slowly, but surely, as he believes, working prophecy into fact, and the shadows as they fall on the dial of time are gradually marking out the cycle which is to usher in those "great months." The partial and inchoate

fulfilment of the good time promised is an earnest and pledge of its grand consummation.

"It is because God is in nature," says Cousin, "that nature has its necessary laws; and it is because Providence is in humanity and in history, that humanity and history have their necessary laws. This necessity, which the vulgar accuse and confound with external and physical fatalism, and by which they disfigure the Divine Wisdom as exemplified in the world, is the unanswerable demonstration of the intervention of Providence in human affairs, — the demonstration of a moral government of the world. Great events are the decrees of this government, promulgated by the voice of time. History is the manifestation of God's supervision of humanity." If, then, philosophy recognizes the Divine supervision and control of human events, we may learn from revelation, as Coleridge observes, the benignant scheme according to which that supervision is regulated; and this providential disposition of events by which the race is made to direct its march to one central point, the establishment of a universal Christendom, he justly pronounces "the most stupendous of miracles." Theology, however, does not merely foreshadow the prevalence of a "reign of righteousness"; it most powerfully contributes to the millennial result which it reveals, and towards which the wise and good in all ages have been straining their eyes. But it is no part of Scriptural truth to teach a dogmatic science of politics, though it paves the way to its acceptance and realization. The Teacher of Galilee did not communicate to Matthew, the tax-gatherer, the true theory of national revenue, any more than he indoctrinated Luke, "the beloved physician," in the true theory of therapeutics.

Having thus considered some of the probabilities which would seem to point towards the future construction of a political system which "shall involve no injustice in its theoretic constitution, and in its practical operation shall involve the minimum of political evil," let us next direct our attention to some of the doubts and difficulties which beset a portion at least of these arguments, if they do not rebut the conclusion to which they tend.

We remark, in the first place, that Mr. Dove, as it seems to

us, has overlooked a very important element in his scheme of scientific classification, considered as constituting of itself an inference in favor of the final evolution of a political science. We think that his tabular arrangement of the sciences not only illustrates the logical and chronological order of their evolution, but distinctly implies that this succession of the sciences is itself determined by a principle which may be stated in the following terms. *In proportion as natural phenomena become more and more modifiable by human intervention, they become less and less capable of reduction to a positive science.* We hold that this law not only graduates the degree of relative complexity in the phenomena considered by the several sciences, but determines also the relative certitude of which the several sciences are susceptible. The two great criteria of a science are, first, the completeness with which its phenomena have been co-ordinated, and secondly, as a consequence of this, the ability it affords us in the prevision and prediction of results. A science must exhibit a "complement of cognitions," and between these cognitions there must be the relations of "logical perfection." Now, in proportion as phenomena fall within the domain of human caprice and free agency, that is, become modifiable by man's intervention, they become, it appears to us, not only more complex and difficult of discovery, but less capable of the fixed and arbitrary objective laws of a didactic and formal science. It is remarkable that those phenomena which admit of a science the most complete in its cognitions, and the most exact in the perfection of its logical processes, are precisely those beyond all human control, as in astronomy. Those phenomena, on the contrary, which are measurably subject to our control, have not yet been reduced to a scientific ordination sufficiently exact to afford us the foresight and prediction of consequences, as in physiology, which will not enable us to foretell the state of our health to-morrow.

M. Comte, in his *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, has argued that, in every branch of knowledge, there exists a constant and necessary connection and harmony between the extent of our intellectual wants and the real compass of our knowledge. In the practical adaptation of inductive science to subserve

the needs of man in the physical world, this would seem to be true; but the principle has not the generality ascribed to it by the French philosopher, when he says that "since, on the one hand, we have only need of knowing what can act upon and affect us more or less directly, so, on the other hand, it necessarily follows from the operation of such influencing agencies upon us, that we are thereby sooner or later supplied with a sure means of knowledge"; for what "influencing agencies" act upon man more directly than those which determine the condition of his health, or those which, in tropical climates, produce the hurricane and the earthquake? Yet it is not found that man's "needs" have insured the discovery of a "knowledge" concerning these phenomena which has either the character or value of scientific certitude. But here the defect may reside in the unfinished state of our scientific researches, not in the nature of the phenomena themselves; and we have alluded to the imperfect condition of our knowledge respecting these "influencing agencies" only to rebut the general proposition asserted by M. Comte, and in order to show that an exact science may be wanting precisely where it would seem to be most useful.

A countryman and contemporary of Mr. Dove has developed this line of argument with much beauty and force.* He attempts to show that there is a cause, independent of the nature of things, why the phenomena which are farthest removed from humanity should be the most simple, and why those which stand in the closest relations with man should be the most complex and difficult of exploration, and this cause he seeks in "the will of God." In phenomena beyond our control we have scientific certitude; in phenomena subject to our control we have not scientific certitude; and this converse parallelism of the two orders of phenomena he resolves into the Divine appointment, and derives from it a theological lesson: for while, in the one case, man is taught his impotence, he learns, in the other, the limitations of his knowledge, and thus gathers from both the great truth of his

* See "The Method of the Divine Government, Physical and Moral," by Rev. James M'Cosh, pp. 172–180. New York. 1854.

dependence on a Creator who is at once omnipotent and omniscient.

On examining the scheme of scientific evolution, the reader will not fail to remark that the abstract sciences of *number*, *quantity*, and *space* precede the inductive sciences, such as mechanics, chemistry, and physiology. This suggests the inquiry why the abstract science of politics (if it be abstract) was not also discovered before the physical sciences. If its truths reside wholly in the rational intellect, and are independent of the actual relations of society, why were not these truths apprehended as early as the rational and axiomatic principles of mathematics?

This query is to be answered by referring to a fact which Mr. Dove recognizes in both of his works, but to which, as we think, he fails to give its proper position in his calculus of probabilities as to the final discovery and adoption of political science. It is not alone, as he would seem to argue, the complexity of the phenomena involved in politics which hinders the evolution of a positive science; nay, more, we venture to intimate that this is not even the chief obstacle, great as it is admitted to be. Man, as Mr. Dove postulates, is capable of acting equitably or inequitably towards his fellows. That he has acted, and does still act, inequitably in his civil relations is the burden of Mr. Dove's writings. Now, if equity be an abstract and primordial intuition of the mind, why all this organic injustice in the framework of society? In seeking the solution of this question, our opinions have room to oscillate between two alternative suppositions; either man's sense of equity has been obliterated by some great moral catastrophe which has perverted his intuitions in the relations of equity, or else these divarications of man's moral sense are to be explained by resolving them into the perturbations which are inseparable from so sensitive an agent, poised on the pivot of free agency, and acted upon by so many influences which *may* cause him to swerve from the fixed poles of right and duty. Without turning aside from our purpose to establish either of these propositions to the exclusion of the other, we may make the general assertion, that no moral questions can admit of an absolute necessity

which is incompatible with human freedom of will, and that responsibility which it involves. In this moral nature of political action, as well as in the complexity of its phenomena, consists, as we think, one of the causes why men did not sooner discover a science of politics, and, *a fortiori*, why they have not carried it into execution.

The cynical Hobbes remarked in his day, that even the axioms of geometry would be disputed if men's passions or interests were implicated in them; and the sting of the satire is in its truth. Mathematical science makes its abstractions in the world of *being*, and develops truth that *is;* thus, "In any right-angled triangle, the square described upon the side subtending the right angle *is* equal to the squares described upon the sides which contain the right angle." Political science makes its abstractions in the realm of *moral action*, and develops truth that *ought to be;* thus, "No man has a *right in equity* (i. e. *ought*) to originate an interference with his fellow-man." Mathematical truth appeals only to the intelligence of men; political truth appeals to their intelligence and volition, — to their intelligence for its subjective apprehension, and to their volition for the translation of this subjective law into an objective rule of life. Mathematical truth may test the acuteness and discernment of the intellect; political truth is the touchstone of morality in man's civil relations. Mathematical truth, considered in its relation to the percipient faculty, is what a man *knows;* political truth converses, not only with what a man knows, but with what he *ought to do* or *not do*. Mathematical truth, when reduced to scientific statement, determines the belief of the mind from the very necessity of its constitution; but political truth, though as immutable as the mathematical in its subjective maxims, cannot by its scientific statement determine the belief and actions of men from any imperious necessity of man's nature, for his moral being obeys a law which lies outside of the rational intellect; else what would become of man's moral probation? And without moral probation virtue becomes impossible.

Political science, therefore, demands, for its establishment in the concrete figure of society, intelligence on the part of all the citizens *to know* what is right and just, and an equal

virtue that shall incline them *to do* what is right and just. And when that happy period arrives, we shall behold a political society involving no injustice in its theoretic constitution, and exhibiting in its practical operation the minimum of political evil; but not till then. The science, so far as it is abstract, merely plants the goal towards which society should tend; it does not insure the progress of society towards that goal. But here it is that political economy becomes the handmaid of political science; for since men are, in the mass, found to be influenced by the argument derived from *the profitable*, though they may be long unmoved by the voice of equity, the political economist seeks to demonstrate the economical evils which flow (and they always do flow, sooner or later, else the harmony of the universe becomes discord) from every infraction of justice. But when political economy shall have completed the "summation of evil consequences," it will avail only to show that man's interest as well as morality is involved in political equity, and it still is not until a virtuous public spirit becomes universal, that the theoretical science will be instaurated among men.*

* In classing, as he does, political economy *before* political science in point of logical order and chronological development, Mr. Dove, as it seems to us, is partly right and partly wrong. Agreeing with him, as we do, in the line of demarcation by which he separates the province of political economy from that of political science in their respective theories, (though it is evident that in practical legislation they must each impinge upon and overlap the other, until each respects the other's boundaries,) we nevertheless think that he has fallen into something like a confusion of ideas in stating the order of their scientific evolution. He sometimes gives to political science the precedence of political economy, and at other times we find him speaking of the former as posterior to the latter, and at still others he speaks of them as if they were synchronous in their development. All very true, but not very clearly defined. The definite statement of their relations to each other seems to be as follows. Legislation, which is politics (of some sort) reduced to practice, must constantly determine politico-economical results. If this legislation is equitable, it will produce good fruits; if inequitable, evil consequences will ultimately arise from it. Of these results political economy takes note, not because they are right or wrong in equity, but because they are beneficial or injurious in point of utility. Thus, political economy does, it is true, dictate the abrogation of all injustice, not, however, because it *is injustice*, but because it *is prejudicial*. And until political science is practically embodied, all questions of positive legislation will be more or less *mixed* questions of political science, on the one hand, and of political economy, on the other. Not until the science of politics is practically established will political economy have

The doctrine of man's free agency, as held by some, leads them also to doubt the reliability of all predictions based on the generalizations of the historical philosopher; for, since history is evolved in the sphere of human freedom, its orbit, they argue, must be infinitely variable, and they are inclined to say, with Kant, that, even if we find humanity has been always advancing, no one can say but that it might to-day begin to retrograde; for, in human affairs, "we have to do with free beings, to whom we may indeed prescribe what they *ought to do*, but of whom we cannot predict what they *will do*."

Large abatements must also be made from the logical probabilities which Mr. Dove derives from the adaptation of man's rational intellect to the actual world. The science of politics, as he has defined and stated it, is the science of *man*, not of *men*. Of this he seems to be aware, for in a foot-note attached to one of his glowing pages he takes occasion to observe, that "political science is abstract; but the real substantive, man, is *concrete*, and his *conditions* must be considered in applying the science to his circumstances." Ay, there is the ultimate test of all political theories, when they come to be applied to the actual relations of men. The student in his "loophole of retreat" may construct a paper constitution for an ideal republic, which shall involve the *summum bonum* of political beatitude; but where shall we find the practical statesman to apply, or the people to receive, this theory? The question then comes, as Mr. Dove

"ample room and verge enough" to fill up the measure of its influence, and accomplish its beneficial purposes.

While, then, both sciences are in their nascent state, the moral use of political economy is to rouse man's dormant, or cure his blinded, sense of equity. Thus far it may precede a part of political science in its evolution; but it is not until the economist's argument addressed to man's interests, combined with man's awakened sense of justice and moral right, shall have induced him to enforce the whole theory of political equity, that the economist's science will be capable of receiving its full and rotund development, unhampered by the organic wrongs of civil society. A perfect science of politics is, therefore, in theory, *anterior* to a perfected science of economy. That the science of economy is now ahead of the science of politics, is because men have studied the former more than the latter, and they have done so because the *useful* is more cogent, alas! than the *right*.

admits, clothed with reality, — teeming with hot life, — warm in the breath and blood of *men.*

Now, it is to be remarked that all the sciences, even the mathematical, are true and exact only in theory and on paper; when they come to be practically applied, they are subject to perpetual abatements and modifications, from the intractable nature of the materials with which they have to deal in the objective world. The theoretical formula which enunciates the law of equilibrium and of virtual velocities in a system of pulleys is constant only in the abstract, that is, as abstracted from the varying friction and flexibility of the ropes. And if this be the case in the application of rational truth to matter, with its fixed properties and qualities, how much greater must be the discrepancies when we come to apply a theoretical science to such complex and variable elements, conditions, and forces as are found in civil society! If in natural dynamics our mathematical formulæ are thus modified and distorted in actual operation, how much more might we expect the *lumen siccum* of the pure reason, as displayed in an abstract political science, to be refracted and scattered in its passage through a medium so "heterogene and dense" as that of actual society! Very true it is that man is endowed with a conscious power of originating, to some extent, the *conditions* necessary to meet the requirements of political science, and in this consists at once the incentive and the explanation of all political striving. But this advantage, which seems to exist in a higher degree in the social sciences than in the natural, is more than offset by the greater complexity of the phenomena embraced in the former than in the latter. For while it is true, as stated by M. Comte, that the phenomena of the several sciences are capable of more extended and varied means of exploration in proportion as they become more and more complex, — yet always so that the increase of our resources does not compensate for the increase of the difficulty in the discovery of any science, — it is equally true that man's greater power of modifying phenomena in society than in the physical world does not compensate for the greater complexity which renders it more difficult, in practice, to adjust to the best advantage the actions of men

in the figure of the former, than it is found to be in the domain of the latter.

It is to be remembered, besides, that the science of politics, which is in theory negative and restrictive, becomes in operation, by virtue of established wrongs, positive and aggressive, in order to restore the relations of men to that condition in which they would have been had there been primarily no unjust interference of man with his fellow. The elements of society are nowhere found in an unformed and unfixed state, ready to receive shape and position beneath the plastic hand of the scientific statesman. The more a social polity needs such remodelling, the more inveterate shall we generally find its institutions to be, and the more stolid and indifferent its subjects to all measures of political melioration.

> "Penitusque necesse est
> Multa diu concreta modis inolescere miris.
> Ergo exercentur pœnis, veterumque malorum
> Supplicia expendunt."

And herein is to be seen the most detestable trait of tyranny; namely, that its long exercise over a people disqualifies and incapacitates them for the enjoyment of a rational liberty. A perfect political system without a people capable of fulfilling its conditions is as useless and inefficacious as a steam-engine before the rails are laid on which it is to run. Hence it is that "our hurrying enlighteners and revolutionary amputators" have often wrought more mischief than good. Able "architects of ruin," when they came to rebuild the edifice they had demolished, they have commenced at the top instead of digging deep its foundation, and therefore have been condemned perpetually to build "castles in the air."

As in the old ethnic mythology true dreams came to mortals through the gate of horn, while false and empty visions entered by the gate of polished ivory, so in this our real world we find, as the poets feigned of dream-land, that things are not always as they seem, and the speculations which have come through the "ivory gate" have been the most flattering, perhaps, but also the least substantial. Political systems the most beautiful and symmetrical, evolved from

brains the most logical, have faded away like a pageant, and "left not a rack behind." So difficult is it to organize society, and "effect the synthesis of matter and spirit," as M. Proudhon phrases it. It is easy to conceive an ideal republic, to picture an Arcadia, to devise an Icarian fraternity, to delineate a social parallelogram on paper; but that ideal republic remains to be founded, Arcadia has not yet been discovered, the disciples of Father Gabet have been scattered abroad, and the phalanstery has proved a failure.

We have begun to despair of man's social regeneration by any system of political truth superimposed *ab extra*, and not developed by himself *ab intra*. With a distinguished jurist of our country, we have learned to attach very little importance to theories, however plausible, which will not work well. They may be very good, abstractly considered, but the application of political science to the concerns of society is the solution of a *problem*, not the demonstration of a *theorem*. Each nation must solve this problem for itself, and no two will solve it alike, because in no two are the conditions the same.

And this leads us to remark, that in this best possible of worlds, as the German philosopher called it, every nation will, in general, have just the government which is best adapted to it. If this optimism smacks of Dr. Pangloss, and seems borrowed from the Castle of Thundertentronckh, we cannot help it. If, as Mr. Dove exultingly declares, "a virtuous and well-instructed population can scarcely be oppressed," it is even more true that an ignorant and vicious population cannot be free; for self-preservation is the first law of nations as well as of individuals, and freedom becomes self-destruction in the hands of those who are unable to govern themselves. Civil protection is more vital to any community than a nominal political freedom, and the former is often gladly purchased at the sacrifice of the latter, as in France, where all civil immunities and privileges are found to be better sheltered under the "thick-bossed buckler" of absolutism than beneath the ægis of Liberty, whom the French seem ignorantly to worship, as did the ancient Athenians the "unknown God."

That equity, therefore, which is immutable in its maxims, and which is absolute in its principles, as the science of politics, in theory, becomes relative in its reduction to practice among men. The axioms of equity are invaluable as *goals* of political progress; but when we look at *men*, — men with flesh and blood, — we are compelled to conclude that certain nations must be, and ought to be, more restrained in the enjoyment of their natural rights than others. It is a sad thing that it is so, and so is it a sad thing that all men are not angels. Admitted that all men have the same natural rights, it is a *non sequitur* to infer that they have therefore the same capacity to enjoy them without infringing the natural rights of others.

We may, therefore, assert that Equity is capable of another division besides those admitted by Mr. Dove, who considers its forms under the three heads of Distributive Justice, Corrective Justice, and Retributive Justice. There is room also for *Preventive Justice*, in order to evolve the whole theory of practical as well as theoretical politics; and the necessity of this preventive justice may be seen in all such communities as need a strong government, because the population is too ignorant or vicious to be free without preying upon one another, and thus inflicting as much more harm on themselves as the tyrants are more numerous in the one case than in the other. Duties are everywhere correlative to rights, and if all men were found to be as swift in the performance of the former as they are quick in the apprehension of the latter, there would be no jarring discord between the theory and the practice of political science. When, therefore, it is asserted that "the surest of all safeguards against insurrection and popular tumult is the absence of the cause that produces them, namely, legislative injustice," we prefer to affirm that a still better safeguard of popular law and order is the absence of the causes which render legislative injustice possible, namely, ignorance and vice.

Every question, says Mr. Dove, has a certain number of possibilities attached to it, and no more. We may exhaust them, and one of them must necessarily be true, even though we may have no sure means to determine which is the true

one. Applying this *rationale* to legislation, he ranges its possibilities under three heads: —

1. Anterior to legislation there must exist natural principles on which legislation ought to be founded; or else,

2. Some particular and definite form of legislation must be of Divine institution and establishment; or else,

3. Legislation ought not to exist.

Mr. Dove, we need not say, accepts the first, as being alone capable of affirmation; but we think he has not exhausted the possibilities, and hence has made a hasty induction, or, as Bacon would phrase it, has arrived at his *vindemiatio*, by confining his attention too exclusively to the *instantiæ convenientes*. A fourth contingency is predicable, as follows: Legislation ought to be, if not always the practical application of abstract principles, the nearest approximation to these principles which is rendered expedient by the moral and intellectual *status* of any people. So at least thought Solon, εὔνους ὢν καὶ δημοτικός, according to Demosthenes, and so, too, thought the wise Hebrew lawgiver, in allowing something for the "hardness of heart" in a people but recently emerged from barbarism and enslavement.

In the light of this reasoning, if it be sound, we are able to see that Mr. Dove's third *axiom* concerning the action of men on one another is not extensive enough. "All just interference," he says, "of one man with another man must be based on the *fact*, that this other man *has* originated an interference with ourselves or others." But there have been communities in which violence was so far paramount, (as during the Reign of Terror, in France,) that every man's hand seemed to be against his fellow, and in which, therefore, there was no room for the play of Mr. Dove's Corrective Justice to restore the elements of society to their equitable condition, nor for his Retributive Justice to prevent intentional crime, since there was no power to enforce the sanctions of the one or the penalties of the other. To provide for a social contingency so abnormal as this, a wise Preventive Justice may propose to itself as its highest duty, not only the punishment of crimes actually committed, (interferences that *have been* originated,) but the forcible enactment of such legislation as

shall restrict the limits of man's natural freedom; and these limits may be justly more and more restricted, in proportion to the violent and aggressive propensities of the people. But this is a principle which needs to be jealously watched in practice, and carefully guarded in theory, lest it conduct to the doctrine of "passive obedience," and all the exploded sophisms of Sir Robert Filmer, or to the arbitrary and cast-iron maxims of Hobbes and Spinoza, who seemed to think that people are made for governments, and not governments for people. The "bed of justice" is not that of Procrustes, nor of Damiens.

History, however, will have failed to read us one of her most impressive lessons, if she has not taught us, by this time, that free institutions cannot be *given*, as a boon, to any nation, but must *grow out* of national tendencies. To suppose that a people can be made free by "declarations of independence," is to suppose, as has been truly said, that man is external to the social organism, instead of being an integral portion of it; and it is not until this mechanical theory has been replaced by a true conception of social dynamics, that we can even imagine the existence of any laws of growth and development in the body politic; much less, that such laws can be observed and discovered.

Do we, then, make a mock of all abstract theories of political science, as being nothing worth? By no means; we rather establish their utility, by seeking to estimate them at their real, and not their fictitious, value. In every state where political questions are agitated at all, two classes of men are necessary in order to lead this agitation to wise results, — the men of theory and the men of practice; for these two orders of men, while each, to some extent, antagonistic to the other, are both necessary to impress a safe and sure progress on political society. Their joint action in each several nation illustrates the principle which Lord Lindsay has applied to the whole commonwealth of nations, — a progression by antagonism. Each of these classes will be found to develop certain needful faculties and propensities disproportionately, and, as it were, in opposition to the other. The former, if not checked by the latter, would rush ahead of the age, and

leave it out of sight; the latter, if not beckoned on by the former, would become laggards and loiterers in the march of improvement. But as it is, the composition of their forces tends to impress on the public polity a line of direction, which is at an equal remove from the centrifugal tendencies of the one and the stationary inaction of the other.

Our readers will not be greatly puzzled to perceive towards which of these two sides we have a leaning; but that the "men of theory" may have the last word in this argument, we resign to Mr. Dove the privilege of closing our disquisition with the contrasted parallel which he runs between the two classes we have named, and in which, while recognizing the place of the *practical* man, he, of course, exalts above it the dignity of the *theorist.* If we had run the parallel, the statement of their relative merits might, perhaps, have been transposed.

"Between these two classes [the *theorists* and the *men of practice*] there must ever be diversity of opinion, so long as the one class is bent on *what is theoretically right*, and the other on what it deems to be *practically expedient.* The first regards the measures of the second as unsatisfactory, as half-measures, as mere sops to allay the Cerberus of popular discontent. The second, on the contrary, regards the measures of the first as impracticable schemes, as *theoretic* measures, good enough, perhaps, in the abstract, (that is, measures which satisfy *the reason,*) but which, from some peculiarity in present circumstances, are quite incapable of application. The one professedly takes *reason* for his criterion, and rejects every measure that falls short of its requirements; the other extends his view no farther than to the single point that enables him to take one step in advance. The one takes the unchangeable and imperishable element of man, the objective reason,* crowns it with imperial authority, and demands that all should at once acknowledge its supremacy; the other takes the variable element of man, — his subjective condition, — and, rejecting every [?] dogma that claims to be absolute, discourses only on the proximate possibility of improving that condition. The one sees the transparent image of truth divested of the garb of humanity; the other sees the outward raiment in its frailty and imperfection, and heeds not to draw aside the drapery that conceals the divinity of reason.

* "Reason," says Mr. Dove, "is *subjective* when in spontaneous operation, but *objective* when translated into language and expressed in propositions."

"Between these two parties, therefore, there is not so much a perpetual warfare as a perpetual misunderstanding. Their point of view is different. They stand on different elevations, and have a quite different range of horizon. The one stands on the top of Pisgah, and beholds afar off the Canaan of his hopes, the land of long expectation, and the land for which the past journeyings of the race have been but the necessary preparations. The other, like Lot, beholds the plain of Jordan, that it is well watered everywhere, and journeys eastward that he may find sustenance for his flock. The one is an intellectualist, who believes in the supremacy of reason, and attributes the systematic errors of society to erroneous propositions. The other is an empiric, who admits no absolute criterion, but admits that the condition of mankind may be gradually improved. The one fixes his eye on *truth*, and forgets the intermediate distance that separates man from its realization. The other fixes his eye on man as he appears at present, forgetting alike the history of his transformation and the probable goal that must form his destination.

"To a certain extent, both are necessary; both are working in the great field of human improvement and of man's amelioration. Incomprehensible as they must ever be to each other, (till the last final item of change shall bring both to an identity of purpose,) they are fellow-laborers in the scheme of human evolution. The one devises afar off the general scheme of progress; the other carries the proximate measures of that scheme into practical operation. The one is the hydrographer who constructs the chart; the other, the mariner who navigates the ship, ignorant, perhaps, what may be its final destination.

"The theorist, too often trusting to his individual perceptions, forgets that propositions which appear to him of absolute certitude can never be accepted by the world until they have received a far wider authentication than any one man can possibly bestow upon them. And though, perchance, he might evolve some propositions which should ultimately be able to stand their ground, experience will prove that the diffusion of truth is no less necessary than its discovery. Truth, like leaven, must pervade the mass before the requisite transformation is effected. On the other hand, the man of practice moves, for the most part, as he is impelled by the convictions of the multitude, and his object is not to theorize, but to design the requisite changes, and to carry them into execution. The theories of to-day he regards with indifference or aversion; they are of no practical avail; he is pressed with the necessity of action, and act he must, or his place must be ceded to another. But he also forgets. He forgets that the very measures which he now reduces to practical operation were the *theories* of the past generation,

and that he is only carrying into execution the schemes which the practical men of other times regarded in the same light as he regards the theories of to-day; and the very theories (some of them at all events) which he regards with aversion are destined to become the measures of some future man of practice, who bestows on the theories of *his* day the same characteristic abhorrence. He forgets that he moves in *action* because the multitude have moved in *mind;* and that the multitude moved in mind because they had imbibed the theories of former speculators, and changed their credence under the influence of conviction. He forgets that change of action comes from change of credence, and that change of credence comes from theoretic speculation. He forgets that, if there were no theories, there would be no change, and if no change, no necessity for him to execute it." * — *Theory of Human Progression*, pp. 415 – 419.

ART. IV. — *An Account of the Pilgrim Celebration at Plymouth, August* 1, 1853; *containing a List of the Decorations in the Town, and correct Copies of the Speeches made at the Dinner-table.* Revised by the Pilgrim Society. Boston: Crosby, Nichols, & Co. 1853. pp. 182.

WITH this interesting pamphlet in our hands, we mused for hours upon Carver, Brewster, Winslow, Standish, and others, who are immortal in New England story; but our thoughts turned at length to the unfortunate and forgotten ones who preceded them. Ere our reveries came to an end, our reflections embraced the whole subject of English success, of French discomfiture, in America. In the hope that previous reading and personal observation in regions which still contain many memorials of value authorize a record of our views, we here submit them to the readers of this journal.

We remark, first, that, unless we are greatly mistaken, the impression is somewhat prevalent that the English Puritans

* How many more things, in the eye of Mr. Dove, the practical man seems to forget than the theorist! Yet the reader, on closely analyzing his list of charges, will find they may be all reduced to one or two. The counts in his indictment pass more for number than variety.